

## CSAG INFORMATION PAPER:

### Integrated Deterrence

Jussi Puustinen, LTC, FIN Army, CSAG/CCJ5 &  
Richard Pečínka, Lt Col, CZE Air Force CSAG/CCJ5

*The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of a number of international officers within the Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of United States Central Command, nor of the nations represented within the CSAG or any other governmental agency.*

**Subject:** CSAG's perspective on the concept of Integrated Deterrence.

1. **Purpose.** To provide CSAG's unvarnished opinion about the Integrated Deterrence Concept. This paper discusses general requirements for implementing the concept, challenges, opportunities, and provides opinions on the questions provided to CSAG. Deterrence here mainly refers to CENTOCOM Priority #1: Deter Iran.
2. **Comments drawn from the definition of Integrated Deterrence (NDS).**
  - a. **General notes.**
    - i. Definition highlights integration (coordination) across spheres and allies but on the other hand puts same weight to instruments of national power and network of alliances and partnerships.
    - ii. Within the definition, the last paragraph can be understood as weaker than the first as it does not say anything related to "integration" and puts posture in the center. This counters the principal of "partnerships over posture".
    - iii. It speaks about "competitor" instead of e.g., adversary or enemy: Iran now also a competitor?
    - iv. It is directly related to strategic competition (detering competitors). We consider this concept addresses the challenge of competing/detering China and Russia as well.
  - b. **Requirements drawn from the concept.**
    - i. What needs to be changed? Why now? Assessment, reflection is needed. Subsequent priorities within deterrence (Syria/ISIS, CHN/RUS...)?
    - ii. Need for shared threat perspective, or identified differences of threats, perspectives; both US intra-agency and with US allies. First establish understanding within US, then with partner nations.
    - iii. Identified positions, roles, and capabilities of partner nations in integration.
    - iv. Clear and shared strategies, policies, goals on all levels, understanding of capabilities and tools of national power.

- v. Structure, procedures, decision making, recourses, coordination, leadership, education. (e.g., the most competent/ relevant leads, others support – requires trust!) i.e., actions of coordination and management.
- vi. Who will lead the process of implementation internally between agencies? Who will lead in the AOR? New concept needs a change of mindset that needs to be managed and learned.

### 3. Challenges and opportunities.

#### a. Challenges for implementing the concept to plans and actions.

- i. Establishing shared understanding and objectives for Integrated Deterrence. Internal political differences and policy shifts and non-aligned views of partner nations.
- ii. Maintaining long term political commitment. US policy changes affect long term commitment in the AOR so, there is a need for strategy that is politically accepted and endures beyond political terms for trust and partner nation commitment.
- iii. Procedural and technical incompatibilities. True integration (especially w/ allies and partners) requires platforms and technologies that enable integration (sharing, coordinating, managing, assessing, C4I, etc.)
- iv. Say-do-gap. Concept needs to be implemented into concrete actions that follow the intent.
- v. Risen risk of confrontation with Iran. If integrated deterrence is to deter Iranian malign actions as well, changes of conflict could rise which in return might increase the risk of open confrontation w/ Iran. Implementation needs a shared and agreed upon form.

#### b. Opportunities.

- i. Leadership of the concept. CENTCOM can take the lead within US agencies in implementing the concept (in AOR). An opportunity for greater influence in implementation, support and outlining policies in the AOR, incl. influence over FMS.
- ii. Revising and aligning objectives, priorities and allocating responsibilities within agencies and partner nations. This can narrow the say-do-gap and help building (regaining) trust.
- iii. Effects of integrated deterrence are greater than individual (US) capabilities. If successfully implemented, combined effects will be greater than individually, thus decreasing the likelihood of conflict.
- iv. Support for innovation. New concept requires change of mindset which can lead to new innovations benefitting not just deterrence but other areas also.
- v. Civil-military cooperation. By engaging the “civil-part” of US presence in the AOR, US might be able to reduce Chinese economic/military advantage. (CENTCOM could e.g., invite key leaders to educate and find ways to collaborate for US model of “civil-military fusion”)

- 4. **Is Integrated Deterrence realistic from a non-US perspective?** It depends on the measures taken—AOR countries’ need actions and results, not concepts—and, as mentioned above, it needs form and consensus. AOR countries view the concept from the perspective of their different relations

with Iran and the type and nature of the Iranian threat to them. (Some may not see a direct threat; to some, the threat is 'Iranian Shiite ideology' and some see it in different levels.) Majority of the regional countries feel different Iranian threats are as important. The acceptance of the concept is also reliant on how the US deals with different AOR countries and how it sees their trade relations with Iran. US needs to (adequately) meet countries' needs (need to compromise). Similarly, this concept needs to be "tailor made" to suit countries' situation. When talking about deterring Iran, the concept needs to be clear in what it deters e.g., open conflict with Iran or the TBM, ITN and, nuclear as well (see comment above about threat perspectives). JCPOA links to the Iranian threat and is highly important to the region, so this concept and measures taken must be credible regardless of the outcome of "JCPOA 2.0".

5. **Will it help alleviate "abandonment" concerns?** It depends on the measures taken related to intentions and objectives (see paragraph 6) as the concept in itself may not address the abandonment concerns. The concept needs to be communicated clearly to help address the abandonment sentiments, improper communications will do the opposite. Once again, actions must follow the words. The current projects related to integration already in process (IAMD) must succeed in order to reduce the skepticism towards the concept.
6. **How will this strategy help us close the "say-do" gap or will it?** All actions must align. Taking leadership of implementing the concept in the AOR shows commitment and will reduce the gap, and if giving leadership to AOR country once implemented would show trust hence even further narrowing the gap. (Also see opportunities). Issue of downward trajectory of less troops need to be balanced with greater weight in representation. (E.g., downgrading military attachés from BRIG to COL raises concerns). If the concept is understood in a unified way, accepted, and implemented the way that it has true value then it would succeed and reduce the say-do-gap.
7. **Conclusion.** This concept requires a new mindset. Success of the concept in the AOR depends on clear communication followed by actions put into place. Integration needs concrete measures of coordination which in return means solid processes, management assessments, etc.—not only between US agencies but with partners and allies too. A dedicated branch or such in CENTCOM is necessary to deal with strategic competition and integrated deterrence as they are linked closely. The concept challenges commanders' priorities or at least the talking points related to them. If integrated deterrence is accepted and implemented properly it can address the current issues, and might also lead to limiting the space for Chinese and Russian influence in the AOR. The concept is wide-ranging but, if China has the "leverage" of innovative dual use of commercial resources (so called civil-military fusion), is the concept comprehensive enough to compete with/deter China? In implementing the concept, consider engaging the "civil-part" of the US presence in the AOR to compete/deter (CENTCOM could e.g., invite key leaders to educate and find ways to collaborate for US model of "civil-military fusion").